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COMMENTS
ment will come in the clarification of uncertainties which have
been evidenced by conflicting jurisprudence over the past half
century. In nearly all areas of uncertainty the drafters of the
Code have adopted the rules followed by the majority of the
courts. As Louisiana has in most cases settled questions arising
under the NIL in accord with the weight of judicial authority,
the Code will affect few substantive changes in the law of this
state.
The adoption of the Code will result in greater uniformity
as to the formal requisites of negotiability than is now present
under the NIL. It is submitted that there is nothing contained
in Part I of Article 3 which should preclude its adoption in
Louisiana, and the clarification which it will provide in many
questions will be a definite improvement over the present law.
Sidney B. Galloway
The Effect of the Adoption of the Proposed Uniform
Commercial Code on the Negotiable Instruments
Law of Louisiana-Rights of a Holder
The Holder in Due Course
A fundamental concept in the law of negotiable instruments
is the legal protection which accompanies the status of holder in
due course. This protection allows the holder in due course, gen-
erally termed a good faith purchaser, to enforce the obligation
represented by the instrument regardless of the fact that the
drawer or maker may have a valid defense against the party
with whom he dealt.' By thus cutting off defenses available be-
tween the immediate parties to the instrument the law provides
a vital element of certainty in commercial paper transactions.
Under the provisions of the proposed Uniform Commercial Code
the holder in due course will still be afforded this legal pro-
tection; however, certain innovations and modifications have
been made in the requirements for the holder in due course
status.
1. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW §§ 57, 58.
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The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law2 lists five require-
ments that must be met in order for a purchaser to be a holder
in due course: (1) The instrument must be complete and regular
on its face; (2) the purchaser must take the instrument before
it is overdue and without notice of any previous dishonor; (3) he
must take it in good faith, (4) for value and (5) without notice
of any infirmities in the instrument or defenses or defects in its
title.8 Under the Code the holder in due course is one who takes
the instrument (1) for value, (2) in good faith, (3) without
notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored and (4) without
notice of any defense against or claim to it on the part of any
person.4
Two changes are apparent from the above enumeration. The
Code does not require without qualification, as does the NIL,
that the instrument be complete and regular or that it be taken
before maturity. With regard to completeness and regularity,
under the Code the question is whether defects on the face of
the instrument are such as to put the purchaser on notice of
defenses.5 With regard to maturity, the question is whether the
purchaser has notice that he istaking an overdue instrument,
not whether the instrument is in fact overdue.6 These two
2. The Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law, hereafter referred to as
the NIL, adopted by Louisiana as La. Acts 1904, No. 64, p. 147; LA. R.S. 7:1-195
(1950).
3. NIL § 52; LA. R.S. 7:52 (1950): "A holder in due course is a holder
who has taken the instrument under the following conditions: (1) That it
is complete and regular upon its face; (2) That he became the holder of it
before it was overdue, and without notice that it had been previously dis-
honored, if such was the fact; (3) That he took it in good faith and for
value; (4) That at the time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of
any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negoti-
ating it."
4. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-302: "(1) A holder in due course is a
holder who takes the instrument (a) for value; and (b) in good faith includ-
ing observance of the reasonable commercial standards of any business in
which the holder may be engaged; and (c) without notice that it is overdue
or has been dishonored or of any defense against or claim to it on the part
of any person. (2) A payee may be a holder in due course. (3) A holder
does not become a holder in due course of an instrument; (a) by purchase
of it at judicial sale or by taking it under legal process; or (b) by acquiring
it in taking over an estate; or (c) by purchasing it as part of a bulk trans-
action not in regular course of business of the transferor. (4) A purchaser
of a limited interest can be a holder in due course only to the extent of the
interest purchased."
5. UCC § 3-302(1)(c); UCC § 3-304(1): "The purchaser has notice of a
claim or defense if (a) the instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible
evidence of forgery or alteration, or is otherwise so irregular as to call into
question its validity, terms or ownership or to create an ambiguity as to
the party to pay ......
6. UCC § 3-302(1)(c). UCC § 3-304(4) sets forth instances in which a
purchaser will- be held to have notice that he is taking an overdue instru-
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changes, among others, will be considered in the following com-
parison of the requisites of the due course position under the
NIL with those under the Commercial Code.
Good faith. The historic decision of Goodman v. Harvey7
rejected the "prudent man" test of good faith under which it
was held that suspicious circumstances alone might be sufficient
to prevent a purchaser from becoming a holder in due course.
This strict rule was replaced by one which required merely that
the purchaser be in actual good faith and hence the fact that
suspicious circumstances existed was no longer decisive. Al-
though it is not made clear by the language of the NIL, it is
generally understood that this latter rule of subjective good faith
was adopted by that act.s The Code, specifying that good faith
includes the "observance of the reasonable commercial standards
of any business in which the holder may be engaged," makes it
clear that the test of good faith is no longer purely subjective but
includes an objective element.9 This change, however, is clearly
not a return to the "prudent man" test. It merely requires that
in addition to actual good faith the purchaser's conduct must
measure up to that of honest businessmen. Such a requirement
appears wise for two reasons. First, regardless of whether objec-
tive or subjective good faith is the test, a determination of either
must be based on known facts surrounding the purchaser's
acquisition of the instrument. Certainly it is more realistic to
decide whether those known facts show observance of honest
business practices than it is to use them as the basis for deter-
ment: "The purchaser has notice that an instrument is overdue if he has
reasonable grounds to believe (a) that any part of the principal amount is
overdue or that there is an uncured default in payment of another instru-
ment of the same series; or (b) that acceleration of the instrument has
been made; or (c) that he is taking a demand instrument after demand has
been made or more than a reasonable length of time after its issue. A rea-
sonable time for a check drawn and payable within the states and territories
of the United States and the District of Columbia is presumed to be thirty
days."
7. 4 Ad. & E. 870, 111 Eng. Rep. 1011 (1836).
8. Comment, 81 U. oF PA. L. REV. 617 (1933). In a Comment, 9 TULANE
L. REv. 128 (1934), it is suggested that although the accepted view restrict.,
good faith under the NIL to a purely subjective standard such a restriction
is not warranted. It is pointed out that the subjective test alone would haV
an undesirable effect on the standard of care in commercial transactions
while creating a market among the less honest businessmen for paper
subject to defenses. See BRITToN, BILLS AND NOTES 410 (1943).
9. The general definition of good faith applicable throughout the entire
Code is found in § 1-201(19) which provides that good faith "means honesty
in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." The additional require-
ment for good faith in commercial paper transactions is found In UCC
§ 2-302(1) (b).
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mining the purchaser's actual state of mind. Second, if an in-
dividual seeks the protection afforded a holder in due course it
is not unreasonable to require proof of conduct free of suspicion,
and in many instances such a requirement will enable defrauded
makers to defend more easily against suits brought by unscrupu-
lous persons attempting to recover on paper subject to defenses.',
What the effect of this change in the test of good faith would
be, insofar as Louisiana is concerned, is conjectural due to the
indecisive treatment of the good faith question by the jurispru-
dence. Also, additional uncertainty results from the fact that
the questions of good faith and notice are often confused, being
considered as more or less identical. It appears, however, that in
the majority of cases the court has not gone beyond determining
whether under the specific facts the holder was or was not in
good faith, or that he did or did not have notice. This approach
by the courts results in the application, though never expressly
so, of a purely objective test; but the standards used, if any, in
applying such a test, cannot be discerned from the opinions.
Some of the language even goes so far as to indicate that the
court is applying the test of "suspicious circumstances.""
Notice. Section 56 of the NIL provides that a purchaser has
notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of
10. In Stevens v. Gaude, 9 La. App. 664 (1928), the plaintiff, over a period
of several years, had purchased a large number of notes from a vendor of
radios. The defendant, proving that radios purchased by him were defec-
tive, defeated recovery on a note given for the purchase price by showing
facts from which it was concluded that the plaintiff was a party interposed.
In similar situations where the evidence is not sufficient to defeat recovery
on that ground the requirement of "observance of reasonable commercial
standards" should be effective to deny the due course status and thus
prevent recovery.
11. In Holmes v. Falsho Realty Co., 132 So. 519, 521 (La. App. 1931), the
court states: "The notes, being 'bearer' notes, and not yet matured, were
negotiable merely by delivery, and any person accepting them in good
faith for value would be under no obligation whatsoever to make inquiry,
unless some suspicious circumstances arose in connection with their negoti-
ation." In Collins v. Magee, 130 So. 267, 269 (La. App. 1930), the court in its
opinion sets forth NIL § 56 under which notice is held when there is actual
knowledge of defenses or knowledge of such facts that the purchaser's
conduct in taking the instrument amounts to bad faith and then goes on to
quote with approval excerpts from decisions prior to the adoption of the
NIL to the effect that the purchaser will not be a holder in due course "if
the circumstances are of such a strong and pointed character as necessarily
to cast a shade on the transaction, and to put the holder on inquiry." See
also Polman v. Converse & Co., 173 La. 793, 138 So. 670 (1931); Metairie
Savings Bank & Trust Co. v. Harris Finance Corp., 59 So.2d 146 (La. App.
1952); Sandifer v. Stephens, 8 La. App. 546 (1928). But see Maxwell v. W. B.
Thompson & Co., 175 La. 252, 143 So. 230 (1932), containing dictum to the
effect that constructive notice does not obtain under the NIL, actual knowl-
edge being the test of NIL § 56.
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the person negotiating it when he has actual knowledge of the
infirmity or defect or knowledge of such facts that his action in
taking the instrument amounts to bad faith.12 This language
resolves notice into a question of whether the purchaser had
actual knowledge or whether he was in bad faith. Although
there is a difference of opinion as to the interpretation of NIL
Section 56,13 the two tests contained therein, of actual knowledge
or bad faith, are applicable to every situation involving a ques-
tion of whether a purchaser took an instrument with notice of
infirmities or defects of title. The Code lays down no single test
to be applied in all cases, but instead provides a general rule,
and, in addition, attempts to resolve conflicts presently existing
in the jurisprudence by specifying what does and what does not
constitute notice in various situations. Section 1-201 contains
general definitions applicable to the Code as a whole, three of
which deal with notice. Section 1-201 (25) defines notice, Section
1-201 (26) specifies how one person notifies another, 14 and Section
1-201 (27) sets forth the tests to determine when a person receives
notice and when notice to an organization becomes effective. 5
Section 1-201(25) provides that "A person has notice of a
fact when (a) he has actual knowledge of it; or (b) he has re-
ceived notice or notification of it; or (c) from all the facts and
circumstances known to him at the time in- question he has
12. NIL § 56; LA. R.S. 7:56 (1950): "To constitute notice of an infirmity
in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negotiating the same,
the person to whom it is negotiated must have had actual knowledge of
the infirmity or defect, or knowledge of such facts that his action in taking
the instrument amounted to bad faith."
13. Comment, 81 U. oF PA. L. REV. 617 (1933), discusses fully the history
and the various interpretations placed on NIL § 56. It is concluded that
because of the vague, ambiguous and confusing statements in both the
judicial opinions and the treatises it is impossible to determine with any
certainty whether the test of bad faith contained therein is objective or
subjective. The author advances the subjective test of bad faith as the
one to be applied on the ground, among others, that the objective test would
restrict negotiability because of the purchaser's fear that a jury might find
that under the circumstances a reasonable man would have been in bad
faith.
14. UCC § 1-201(26): "A person 'notifies' another by taking such steps
as may be reasonably required to inform the other in ordinary course
whether or not such other party actually comes to know of it."
15. UCC § 1-201(27): "A person 'receives' a notice or notification when
(a) it comes to his attention; or (b) it is duly delivered at the place of
business through which the contract was made or at any other place held
out by him as the place for receipt of such communications.
"Notice or a notification received by an organization is effective for a
particular transaction from the time when it is brought to the attention
of the individual conducting that transaction, and in any event from the
time when it would have been brought to his attention if the organization
had exercised due diligence."
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reason to know it exists." Particular attention should be directed
to paragraph (c) above. The exact meaning of the language is
subject to a difference of opinion; however, it seems clear that
the test embodied therein is stricter than that of NIL Section 56
under which notice is held only if the facts known amount to
bad faith (in the absence of actual knowledge). Certainly a pur-
chaser having knowledge of a given set of facts might be held to
have reason to know of a defense, whereas under the same
circumstances he could not be held to be in bad faith. The lan-
guage of the Code might be interpreted as a return to the long-
discarded rule under which suspicious circumstances alone were
held to deprive a purchaser of the due course status. Needless to
say, such a consequence should be avoided if commercial paper
is to retain the necessary degree of liquidity.
As was stated previously, the treatment of the good faith
and notice requirements by the Louisiana courts has been vague
and ambiguous, little differentiation if any being made between
the two concepts. No consolation is derived from the fact that
the same confusion exists in other jurisdictions. 16 Thus there is
an urgent need for a clear test of notice in commercial paper
transactions and the Code does not appear to provide such a
test.
A desirable clarification on the question of notice to an
organization is found in Section 1-201 (27). An example of the
problem which may be presented is found in the situation where
a number of bearer bonds out of a large issue are stolen and
notification is sent to a banking house which later purchases
some of the stolen bonds. The Louisiana jurisprudence reveals
nothing of a pertinent nature in regard to this facet of the notice
problem; however, the United States Supreme Court in the case
of Graham v. White-Phillips Co.' held that the test of good faith
is to be applied as of the date of the purchase and that notice
received at a previous date is only prima facie evidence of bad
faith. The possibility of "organizational forgetting" is eliminated
by the section of the Code referred to above which provides in
terms that an employee has notice from the time it is brought to
his attention or from the time it would have been brought to his
attention if the organization had exercised due diligence.
As previously stated, the subsections of Section 1-201 dis-
cussed above are general provisions defining terms which are
16. See note 13 supra.
17. 296 U.S. 27 (1935).
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used throughout the entire Code. Section 3-304, set out in the
note for reference,8 is the principal section insofar as notice
in commercial paper transactions is concerned. Subsection 1(a)
replaces the requirement of the NIL that the instrument must
be "complete and regular on its face." This requirement does
not appear to have been given judicial gloss by any Louisiana
decision; therefore only the statutory law as embodied in the NIL
will be affected by the Code. As is stated by the draftsmen in
the comment following Section 3-304, irregularity is properly
a question of notice to the purchaser. One should not be denied
18. UCC §3-304: "(1) The purchaser has notice of a claim or defense if
(a) the instrument is so incomplete, bears such visible evidence of forgery
or alteration, or is otherwise so irregular as to call into question its validity,
terms or ownership or to create an ambiguity as to the party to pay; or
(b) the purchaser has notice that the obligation of any party is voidable in
whole or in part, or that all parties have been discharged.
"(2) The purchaser has notice of a claim against the instrument when
he has reasonable grounds to believe (a) that the transfer to him is a
preference voidable under the law of bankruptcy or insolvency; (b) that a
fiduciary has negotiated the instrument in payment of or as security for
his own debt or in any transaction for his own benefit or otherwise in
breach of duty.
"(3) Except as provided with respect to conditional, trust or collection
indorsements in the course of bank collections (Sections 4-203 and 4-205),
the purchaser also has notice of a claim against the instrument if it has
previously been indorsed conditionally or in such manner as to prohibit
further negotiation and such indorsement has not been cancelled.
"(4) The purchaser has notice that an instrument is overdue if he has
reasonable grounds to believe
"(a) that any part of the principal amount is overdue or that there is
an uncured default in payment of another instrument of the same
series; or
"(b) that acceleration of the instrument has been made; or
"(c) that he is taking a demand instrument after demand has been
made or more than a reasonable length of time after its issue. A
reasonable time for a check drawn and payable within the states
and territories of the United States and the District of Columbia
is presumed to be thirty days.
"(5) Knowledge of the following facts does not of itself give the pur-
chaser notice of a defense or claim
"(a) that the instrument is antedated or postdated;
"(b) that it was issued or negotiated in return for an executory prom-
ise or accompanied by a separate agreement, unless the purchaser
has notice that a defense or claim has arisen from the terms
thereof;
"(c) that any party has signed for accommodation;
"(d) that an incomplete instrument has been completed, unless the
purchaser has notice of any improper completion;
"(e) that any person negotiating the instrument is or was a fiduciary;
"(f) that there has been default in payment of interest on the instru-
ment or in payment of any other instrument, except one of the
same series.
"(6) The filing or recording of a document does not of itself constitute
notice within the provisions of this Article to a person who would otherwise
be a holder in due course.
"(7) To be effective notice must be received at such time and in such
manner as to give a reasonable opportunity to act on it."
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the due course position merely because of some minor particular,
such as a change in date, which would not even excite suspicion.
Although some modification of the present rule of the NIL is
desirable, the language used in this subsection, as has been
pointed out by Beutel, is certain to cause difficulties in inter-
pretation.19 If, under the terms of that subsection, the instru-
ment is so incomplete or otherwise irregular as to call into
question its validity, terms of ownership or to create an am-
biguity as to the party to pay, the purchaser is held to be on
notice of a "claim or defense." The terms "claim or defense"
are not defined by the Code and their meaning as used in this
connection is obviously not that which they commonly convey.
If a purchaser takes an instrument on which the sum due has
been crossed out and a different amount substituted therefor,
clearly, under the Code provision, this would constitute an
"irregularity" sufficient to put the purchaser on notice of a
"claim or defense." Actually, there is no claim or defense,
merely an infirmity in the instrument. On the other hand, under
Subsection 1 (b) the purchaser has notice of a "claim or defense"
if he has notice that "all parties have been discharged." Thus
the instrument may be taken with knowledge that a co-maker,
surety, or endorser has been discharged and yet the purchaser
is not on notice of a defense because he does not have notice
"that all parties have been discharged." (Italics supplied.) How
can it be said that a purchaser with knowledge of the discharge
of one of the obligors on an instrument takes it without notice
of a defense?
Subsections 2 (b) and 5 (e) will allow a purchaser to become
a holder in due course, although he takes an instrument from
one whom he knows to be a fiduciary, provided he does not
have "reasonable grounds to believe" the fiduciary has breached
his duty. It seems questionable to deny the due course position
to an individual who dealt with an agent on the basis of a find-
ing that at the time of the transaction he had "reasonable
grounds to believe" that the agent was violating a trust. This
language might unhappily be interpreted as placing persons
dealing with fiduciaries on a kind of constructive notice in case
of misappropriation.2"
19. Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Commercial Code, Article 3,
and the Negotiable Instruments Law, 30 NEB. L. REV. 531, 546 (1951).
20. The Uniform Fiduciaries Law was adopted by La. Acts 1924, No. 226,
p. 438; LA. R.S. 9:3801-3814 (1950). In the comment by the commissioners
following Section 3-304 of the Commercial Code it is stated that Subsection
[VOL. XV
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The holder in due course under the NIL must have taken
the instrument before it was overdue.21 Under the Code a pur-
chaser may take an overdue instrument and yet be a holder
in due course; the requirement is that he take it without notice
that it is overdue.2 2 Subsection (4) of Section 3-304 specifies
certain instances in which the purchaser has notice that the
instrument is overdue. It provides in part, using the questionable
language "reasonable grounds to believe," commented on above,
that a purchaser "has notice that an instrument is overdue if
he has reasonable grounds to believe that any part of the prin-
cipal amount is overdue or that there is an uncured default
in the payment of another instrument of the same series." Thus
it will be possible for the purchaser of an installment note to
become a holder in due course although there has been a default
on one of the installments provided he is not on notice of the de-
fault. This result cannot be reached under the NIL, since the
purchaser of such a note is technically taking it after maturity.28
In view of this relaxation of the strict NIL rule requiring pur-
chase before maturity it is anomalous to find that the latter
part of the above quoted provision will deny the due course
status to a purchaser who takes one of a series of notes prior
to its maturity but with notice that another note in the same
series has not been paid at maturity. It seems illogical to hold
that knowledge of a default on one note of a series constitutes
(2) (b) follows the policy of the Uniform Fiduciaries Law, and specifies the
same elements as notice of improper conduct of a fiduciary. However, a
comparison of the language in the pertinent sections does not seem to sup-
port this statement. Section 6 of the Uniform Fiducaries Law provides:
"If a check or other bill of exchange is drawn by a fiduciary as such, or
in the name of his principal by a fiduciary empowered to draw such instru-
ment in the name of his principal, payable to the fiduciary personally, or
payable to a third person and by him transferred to the fiduciary, and is
thereafter transferred by the fiduciary, whether in payment of a personal
debt of the fiduciary or otherwise, the transferee is not bound to inquire
whether the fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary
in transferring the instrument, and is not chargeable with notice that the
fiduciary is committing a breach of his obligation as fiduciary unless he
takes the instrument with actual knowledge of such breach, or with the
knowledge of such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounts to
bad faith." The tests of actual knowledge or bad faith contained in this
provision are the same as those found in NIL § 56, and, as pointed out in
another connection, the test of "reasonable grounds to believe" of the Code
clearly appears to hold purchasers to a stricter degree of care than the
test of "bad faith." Beutel, Comparison of the Proposed Commerical Code,
Article 3, and the Negotiable Instruments Law, 30 NEB. L. REv. 531, 548
(1951), states that Subsection (2) contemplates constructive notice of fidu-
ciary claims thus dragging in all the exceptions and many more which the
Uniform Fiduciary Act created to NIL § 56.
21. NIL § 52, quoted note 3 supra.
22. UCC § 3-302(1) (c), quoted note 4 supra.
23. BarrroN, BILLs AND NOTES § 110 (1943).
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notice to the purchaser that all other notes of the same series
are overdue although by their terms they have not reached
maturity. Furthermore, in most instances the fact that one note
is not paid at maturity indicates only that the maker was unable
to pay at that time and would not put the purchaser on notice
of possible defenses. This provision would effect a change of
the existing law in a majority of jurisdictions, and dictum in
one Louisiana decision indicates that it would effect a change
here also.24
Value. Section 25 of the NIL provides that "value is any
consideration sufficient to support a simple contract." Since a
promise to pay is considered sufficient consideration to support
a contract it would seem that the purchaser of a negotiable
instrument who gives such a promise has given value and thus,
insofar as that requirement for the due course position is con-
cerned, may be a holder in due course. 25 However, NIL Section
54 provides that a transferee who receives notice of a defense
before paying the full amount agreed upon is a holder in due
course only to the extent of the amount actually paid.26 Thus
a purchaser who has given merely a promise to pay would not
appear to have given value under Section 54 because nothing
has actually been paid.27 The weight of judicial authority has fol-
lowed Section 54 in holding that a bank which receives a nego-
tiable instrument from a depositor and merely credits his ac-
count has not given value .2  The bank's promise to pay upon
demand of the depositor is not considered as value. The Code has
extended this rule regarding bank credit to cover all transac-
tions involving commercial paper by providing that no execu-
tory promise to give value is value itself except where a nego-
24. In Bank of Eudora v. Crowe, 2 La. App. 669 (1925), the court states
that there was no evidence showing that the holder of two notes of a series
had knowledge of a previous default on another note of the series; however,
authorities are cited with approval which hold that the purchaser of a note
before maturity may be a holder in due course although notes in the same
series are not paid. See BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 454 (1943).
25. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 498 et seq., 721 et seq. (7th
ed., Beutel, 1948).
26. NIL § 54; LA. R.S. 7:54 (1950): "Where the transferee receives notice
of any infirmity in the instrument or defect in the title of the person negoti-
ating the same before he has paid the full amount agreed to be paid there-
for, he will be deemed a holder in due course only to the extent of the
amount theretofore paid by him."
27. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 499 (7th ed., Beutel, 1948);
BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 400 (1943). Beutel contends that NIL § 54 does not
apply to credit because the credit itself is the full amount to be given.
28. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 97 (1943).
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tiable instrument is given or an irrevocable commitment is
made to a third person.2 9
The question of whether bank credit constitutes value does
not appear to be settled in Louisiana. A court of appeal deci-
sion30 expressly adopted the rule that mere crediting of an
account is value; however, a careful examination of the facts
of that case reveals that the language used in the opinion is
somewhat broader than was required for the decision; thus the
holding cannot be relied upon as the basis for any unquali-
fied prediction as to the result of future litigation on this ques-
tion. The facts of the case may be stated as follows: The
amount of a draft drawn by the defendant was credited to
his account by bank A, the payee of the draft. The draft was
then forwarded to the bank B, which had possession of it when
Bank A failed. Defendant notified the drawee not to pay the
draft and Bank B sought to enforce payment against the defen-
dant. The defense was that Bank A was only an agent for collec-
tion, acquired no title to the draft, and therefore could not pass
title to bank B. The court held that the defendant had unre-
strictedly endorsed the draft and that the crediting of his
account constituted a giving of value, at which time the bank
became owner of the draft. Admittedly, the question of whether
crediting of an account is to be considered as value so as to
make a bank a holder in due course was not presented. The
issue was whether the bank had become owner of the draft.
However, language in the opinion may be considered as indi-
cating that in Louisiana credit would be considered as value
under any circumstances. If that be true the adoption of the
Code would establish a rule directly to the contrary.
If the credit itself is not considered value, what is the result
in a case where a bank seeks to establish itself as a holder in
due course? In that event it becomes necessary to determine
the extent to which the credit has been withdrawn, for the
29. UCC § 3-303: "A holder takes the instrument for value (a) to the
extent that the agreed consideration has been performed or that he acquires
a security interest in or a lien on the instrument otherwise than by legal
process; or (b) when he takes the instrument in payment of or as security
for an antecedent claim against any person whether or not the claim is due;
or (c) when he gives a negotiable instrument for it or makes an irrevocable
commitment to a third person."
30. First National Bank v. Cross & Napper, 157 So. 636 (La. App. 1934).
See In re liquidation of Canal Bank & Trust Co., 181 La. 856, 160 So. 609
(1935), which held that a bank in which an instrument has been deposited
for credit has title and the depositor cannot recover it back after failure
of the bank.
1955]
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amount withdrawn has actually been paid and to that extent
the bank may be a holder in due course. This determination
will be necessary in applying the rule adopted by the Code, the
rule that credit is not value. In ascertaining the extent to which
credit has been drawn on, the majority of courts apply what
is commonly known as the "first money in, first money out"
rule. This means simply that the first withdrawals are charged
against the first credits. A minority rule makes the bank a
holder for value only if the balance in the account falls below
the amount of the deposited item.31 The application of these
accounting techniques is often beset with difficulties, especially
in cases involving active accounts where numerous deposits
and withdrawals are made during the interval between the de-
posit and the dishonor of the litigated instrument. 32 Thus it
can readily be seen that, insofar as simplicity is concerned, the
rule that credit constitutes value has much to be said in its
favor.
Those who are opposed to considering credit as value con-
tend (1) that since the bank may charge back the account of
its depositor it does not need the protection afforded a holder
in due course and (2) that to give it this protection irrespective
of the right to charge back will allow inequitable recoveries
from defrauded makers.3 3 On careful analysis, however, these
contentions do not appear as sound as they might on first im-
pression. The rule that credit must be withdrawn before value
has been given does not alter the fact that a bank may become
a holder in due course although it might have charged back
the account. For example, if A deposits Y's note for $100 and
immediately withdraws $100, the bank in suing on the note is
a holder for value. This is true although A deposits another
$100 in cash immediately after Y has refused the bank's demand
for payment and thus establishes a balance sufficient for a full
charge back. In this example it is clear that credit has been
31. The Code specifically adopts. the "first-in, first-out" rule. Section
4-209 provides: "For purposes of determining its status as a holder in due
course, the bank has given value to the extent that it has a security interest
in an item. ... Section 4-208 provides: "(1) A bank has a security interest
in an item and any accompanying documents or the proceeds of either
"(a) in case of an item deposited in an account to the extent to which
credit given for the item has been withdrawn or applied; . . ..
"(3) For the purpose of this section, credits first given are first with-
drawn."
32. See, generally, BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 506 (7th ed.,
Beutel, 1948); BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 97 (1943).
33. Steffen, The Check Collection Muddle, 10 TULANE L. REV. 537 (1936).
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withdrawn; therefore either of the two accounting tests men-
tioned above make the bank a holder for value. In addition, if
the bank has available the simple method of charge back it is
seldom that it would undergo the risk and burden of litigation.
Practically speaking this is the soundest basis for refuting the
arguments opposed to considering credit as value. 34
In conclusion, it appears that the arguments for rejecting
the rule that bank credit constitutes value are not convincing.
That rule offers a clear, simple test, unhampered by techni-
calities of application, and thus it is believed that the present
definition of value in the Code should be replaced by one which
makes it clear that a promise to pay is value.
The Payee as a Holder in Due Course
Generally speaking a payee cannot be a holder in due course
because in most instances he deals directly with the drawer or
maker and therefore has knowledge of any defenses against the
instrument. However, the common law held that a payee might
be a holder in due course if he met the requisites of that posi-
tion.35 It sometimes happens that the payee deals solely with
an agent of the maker and in those cases, among others, there
would seem to be nothing inherent in the status of the payee
as such to prevent him from becoming a holder in due course.
Subsequent to the adoption of the NIL, and despite the logic
of the view which allows a payee to be a holder in due course,
a conflict developed on this question due to different interpre-
tations of the act.36 The Code will resolve this dispute by a
specific provision declaring that a payee may be a holder in
due course.3 In view of the conflict presently existing this is
a desirable clarification; however, the same result may be
reached under what appears to be the soundest interpretation
of the NIL.38
34. For a complete consideration of the change incorporated in the UCC,
see Note, Bank Credit a Value: The Commercial Code Article III, 57 YALE
L.J. 1419 (1948).
35. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 508 (1943).
36. Ibid.
37. UCC § 3-302(2).
38. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW 675 et seq. (7th ed., Beutel,
1948). This interpretation is illustrated as follows: Section 52 defines a
holder in due course as a "holder" who has taken the instrument under the
conditions set forth in that section. Section 191 defines "holder" as a "payee
or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof."
Thus, replacing the word "holder" in Section 52 with the definition of that
term found in Section 192, Section 52 would read "a holder in due course is
a payee or indorsee who is in possession," etc. Up to this point it would
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Only one Louisiana case was found in which the factual
situation called for a consideration of the question of whether
a payee may be a holder in due course.39 The payee sued the
makers and co-makers of a note. The note had been delivered
by the maker to the payee out of the presence of the co-makers.
The court first found that the evidence was sufficient to estab-
lish the authenticity of only one of the alleged signatures of
the co-makers. As to that co-maker the court held that the
payee was free to recover regardless of the fact that the amount
of the note had been misrepresented by the maker in obtaining
the co-maker's signature. The plaintiff-payee was a purchaser
in good faith and equities between the maker and co-maker could
not defeat his recovery. The court in this case discussed neither
the NIL nor the question of whether a payee may be a holder
in due course; however, the plaintiff-payee was afforded the
protection associated with the status of holder in due course
regardless of the fact that he was not expressly designated as
such. Although it would be desirable to have a clearer judicial
expression as the basis for any conclusion, it would appear that
the present Louisiana law on this question is in accord with the
Code.
Rights of a Holder in Due Course: Non-Delivery of an Incom-
plete Instrument No Longer a Real Defense
Section 15 of the NIL provides that "where an incomplete
instrument has not been delivered it will not, if completed and
negotiated, without authority, be a valid contract in the hands
of any holder, as against any person whose signature was placed
thereon before delivery. '4  Thus under this section even a
holder in due course cannot recover on an instrument which
was not completed by the maker or drawer and which was not de-
livered by him. NIL Section 16 states that where the instrument
is in the hands of a holder in due course a valid delivery by
seem clear that the payee may be a holder in due course. However, courts
reaching a contrary result do so on the grounds that Section 52 indicates
that the holder in due course must acquire the instrument by negotiation.
It is said that negotiation can take place only by indorsement and since a
payee does not take by indorsement he cannot be a holder in due course.
But this restricted meaning of "negotiation" does not seem proper. Section
30 provides: "An instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one
person to another in such a manner as to constitute the transferee the
holder thereof." As Section 191 makes "a payee ...who is in possession"
a holder, it is apparent that when the instrument is transferred to the payee,
thus making him a holder, a negotiation has taken place.
39. White System of Shreveport v. Theus, 182 So. 394 (La. App. 1938).
40. NIL § 15; LA. R.S. 7:15 (1950).
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all prior parties is conclusively presumed. 41 Under this section
the holder in due course may recover on an instrument which
was completed by the maker or drawer although it was not
delivered by him. Under Section 14 an instrument issued in
incomplete form and subsequently filled up may be enforced
by a holder in due course as actually completed. 42 Stated con-
cisely, the result of these three NIL sections is that non-de-
livery and incompleteness of an instrument are personal defenses
when considered individually and will not defeat a holder in
due course, but the two together constitute a real defense valid
against such a holder.43 It is difficult to draw any rational dis-
tinction between a due course holder's position in respect to
two checks stolen from the drawer, one drawn to "cash" for a
stated sum and the other signed in blank, yet the NIL does just
that. The good faith purchaser takes both instruments under
the same circumstances and there is no justifiable basis for
allowing recovery on the one and not on the other. In both
instances careless handling of the checks by the drawer is the
cause of any loss; therefore he should be the one to bear it.44
41. NIL § 16; LA. R.S. 7:16 (1950): "Every contract on a negotiable in-
strument is incomplete and revocable until delivery of the instrument for
the purpose of giving effect thereto.
"As between immediate parties, and as regards a remote party other than
a holder in due course, the delivery, in order to be effectual, must be made
either by or under the authority of the party making, drawing, accepting,
or indorsing, as the case may be; and in such case the delivery may be
shown to have been conditional, or for a special purpose only, and not for
the purpose of transferring the property in the instrument. But where the
instrument is in the hands of a holder in due course, a valid delivery thereof
by all parties prior to him so as to make them liable to him is conclusively
presumed. And where the instrument is no longer in the possession of a
party whose signature appears thereon, a valid and intentional delivery by
him is presumed until the contrary is proved."
42. NIL § 14; LA. R.S. 7:14 (1950): "Where the instrument is wanting in
any material particular, the person in possession thereof has a prima facie
authority to complete it by filling up the blanks therein. And a signature
on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature in order that
.the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as a
prima facie authority to fill it up as such for any arhount. In order, how-
ever, that any such instrument when completed may be enforced against
any person who became a party thereto prior to its completion, it must be
filled up strictly in accordance with the authority given and within a
reasonable time. But if any such instrument, after completion, is negotiated
to a holder in due course, it is valid and effectual for all purposes in his
hands, and he may enforce it as if it had been filled up strictly in accordance
with the authority given and within a reasonable time."
43. No Louisiana cases could be found in which non-delivery of an
incomplete instrument was raised as a defense against a holder in due
course; however, the cases decided under the NIL recognize it as valid
against such a holder. See BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 88 (1943).
44. For a discussion of this problem and a favorable comment on the
change made by the Code, see Sutherland, Article S-Logic, Experience and
Negotiable Paper, [1952] Wis. L. REV. 230, 245.
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The Code makes a much-needed change in correcting this
inequity done the holder in due course. Section 3-115, together
with Section 3-407, states that even though the incomplete
instrument is not delivered a holder in due course may enforce
it as completed.45
Fraud as a Real Defense
At common law two types of fraud which might be involved
in the execution of a negotiable instrument were distinguished.
"Fraud in the factum" was held to exist when a person, without
negligence, signed a negotiable instrument but did so because
the true character of the instrument was misrepresented. For
example, the maker of a note might have been led to believe
that he was signing a release. This type of fraud was recognized
as a real defense which might be raised against a holder in due
course provided there were no grounds for estoppel present. On
the other hand, where an individual was induced by misrepre-
sentation to sign what he knew to be a negotiable instrument,
such was held to be "fraud in the inducement" and was con-
sidered a personal defense not available against the holder in
due course.46 The NIL does not expressly deal with what the
common law termed "fraud in the factum"; and Britton takes
the position that the act may be subject to two interpretations,
one giving such fraud the status of a real defense, the other
placing it in the category of equitable defenses.47 However,
the majority of cases decided since the adoption of the act have
held to the common law rule that "fraud in the factum" is a
real defense.48
Louisiana's position on this question appears to be contrary
to the weight of authority. Although the NIL was not discussed
nor any distinction between the types of fraud recognized, the
holding in the case of General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Schoneke stands for the proposition that "fraud in the fac-
45. UCC § 3-115(2): "If the completion is unauthorized the rules as to
material alteration apply (Section 3-407), even though the paper was not
delivered by the maker or drawer; but the burden of establishing that any
completion is unauthorized is on the party so asserting."
UCC § 3-407(3): "A subsequent holder in due course may in all cases
enforce the instrument according to its original tenor, and when an in-
complete Instrument has been completed, he may enforce it as completed."
46. BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAw 758 et seq. (7th ed., Beutel,
1948); BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 130 (1943).
47. Britton, Fraud in the Inception of Bills and Notes, 9 CORNELL L.Q.
138, 156 (1923).
48. See note 46 supra.
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turn" is an equitable defense only.49 In that case the testimony
of the defendant's witnesses was to the effect that the defendant
had been sick for a number of years and was an invalid at the
time he signed the instrument in question. It was further testi-
fied that the defendant had been led by misrepresentation to
believe he was signing a character recommendation for the
other defendant, who was a co-signer, of what in fact was a
negotiable instrument. The court, evidently not impressed by
the testimony, conceded that there had been fraud but stated
that since the plaintiff was a holder in due course no equities
could be pleaded against him. The General Motors case, in not
recognizing fraud in factum as a real defense, fails to appre-
ciate that reality of assent to be bound is one of the conditions
precedent to a binding contract on a negotiable instrument. 50 The
Commercial Code will correct this situation. It expressly car-
ries forward the fraud in factum doctrine and even extends the
defense to the instrument signed with knowledge that it is a
negotiable instrument but without knowledge of its essential
terms. The pertinent part of Section 3-305 lists as one of the
defenses which may be raised against the holder in due course
the following:
"(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to
sign the instrument with neither knowledge nor reason-
able opportunity to obtain knowledge of its character
or its essential terms."'5
Under this provision the test will no longer be whether the
party knew or did not know that he was signing a negotiable
instrument. This change recognizes that it is not the type of
fraud which invalidates the instrument but the lack of consent.
Since lack of consent is present whether the party was induced
49. 140 So. 111 (La. App. 1932). See Note, 11 TULANE L. REV. 129 (1936).
50. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 586 (1943).
51. UCC § 3-305 provides in full: "To the extent that a holder is a holder
in due course he takes the instrument free from
"(1) all claims to it on the part of any person; and
"(2) all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder
has not dealt except
"(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract; and
"(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction, as
renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and
"(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the in-
strument with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to
obtain knowledge of its character or its essential terms; and
"(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
"(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes
the instrument."
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to sign a negotiable instrument believing it to be a receipt or
whether he signed knowing it to be a negotiable instrument
but deceived as to its essential terms, in both cases the defense
should be available.
Although this provision will work a more drastic change
in Louisiana than in those jurisdictions which at present con-
sider fraud in factum a real defense, it is a change that is needed.
The phrase "with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity
to obtain knowledge" will restrict the availability of this defense
to those instances in which the signer is deserving of protec-
tion. Such cases are rare and to protect the defrauded indi-
vidual will not cause any noticeable detriment to the liquidity
of commercial paper.52
Rights of One Not a Holder in Due Course: Defendant May Not
Set up Claims of a Third Party
Under the NIL an obligor may successfully defend an action
on a negotiable instrument if he can prove that the plaintiff
has no legal title to the instrument.53 However, there is a con-
flict on the question of whether the holder of the legal title
may be defeated by an obligor who, having no defense of his
own, seeks to interpose a claim of a third party to the instru-
ment.54 The NIL does not deal with the problem expressly and
the implications from a number of sections are inconsistent.
Certain sections deny the right of a defendant, in the cases
specifically covered, to set up a third party's claim to the instru-
ment, while other sections may be interpreted so as to give the
defendant such a right in the instances not specifically treated
elsewhere.55
The Code clarifies these inconsistencies. Section 3-306 pro-
vides that "unless he has the rights of a holder in due course
any person takes the instrument subject to .... (d) the defense
52. Britton, Fraud in the Inception of Bills and Notes, 9 CORNELL L. Q.
140 (1923), notes that the number of cases involving fraud has decreased
since 1890.
53. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 749 (1943).
54. Id. at 752.
55. Id. § 159, for a complete discussion of the problem and analysis of
the pertinent NIL sections. It is pointed out that Sections 60, 61, 62, 22 and
39 "are in harmony with a general rule which would deny the defendant
the right to set up a lack of capacity in any indorser to negotiate and to
set up any jus tertifl, but these sections do not, in express terms, go that
far .... On the other hand, implications from Sections 59, 51, 119 and 88
point in the direction of the right of the defendant to set up, successfully,
any jus tertli or defective title in the plaintiff."
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that he or a person through whom he holds the instrument ac-
quired it by theft. The claim of any third person to the instru-
ment is not otherwise available as a defense to any party liable
thereon unless the third person himself defends the action for
such party." 6  (Italics supplied.) The Louisiana jurisprudence
is in accord with the general rule stated in this section and,
although no cases could be found involving theft, the exception
made is consistent with the general principle which denies to
a thief the aid of the courts in perpetrating his wrongdoing. 57
In view of the difficulties encountered under the NIL the
inclusion of a provision in the Code specifically prohibiting a
defendant from setting up claims of third parties seems wise.
As is stated in the comment following Section 3-306, "the con-
tract of the obligor is to pay the holder of the instrument and
the claims of other persons against the holder are not his con-
cern. He is not required to set up such a claim as a defense,
since he usually will have no satisfactory evidence of his own
on the issue; and the provision that he may not do so is in-
tended as much for his protection as for that of the holder."
Burden of Proof and Presumptions
Section 3-307, set out in the note,58 is an expanded version
56. UCC § 3-306 provides in full: "Unless he has the rights of a holder
in due course any person takes the instrument subject to
"(a) all valid claims to it on the part of any person; and
"(b) all defenses of any party which would be available in an action
on a simple contract; and
"(c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, non-performance
of any condition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a special
purpose; and
"(d) the defense that he or a person through whom he holds the instru-
ment acquired it by theft. The claim of any third person to the
instrument is not otherwise available as a defense to any party
liable thereon unless the third person himself defends the action
for such party."
57. Equipment Finance Corp. v. Atkins, 139 So. 154 (1932); Quick v.
Littlejohn, 156 La. 369, 100 So. 531 (1924).
58. UCC § 3-307: "(1) Unless specifically denied in the pleadings each
signature on an instrument is admitted. When the effectiveness of a
signature is put in issue
"(a) the burden of establishing it is on the party claiming under the
signature; but
"(b) the signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized except where
the action is to enforce the obligation of a purported signer who
has died or become incompetent before proof is required.
"(2) When signatures are admitted or established, production of the
instrument entitles a holder to recover on it unless the defendant establishes
a defense.
"(3) After evidence of a defense has been introduced a person claiming
the rights of a holder in due course has the burden of establishing that he
or some person under whom he claims is in all respects a holder in due
course."
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of NIL Section 5959 and should serve to clear up some procedural
conflicts presently existing. Under Subsections (1) and (1) (b)
of the Code provision a defendant who intends to put at issue
the validity of any signature on an instrument must not only
specifically deny it in his pleadings but must also introduce
evidence in support of his denial before the plaintiff is put to
proof of its genuineness. This will effect a change in the major-
ity of jurisdictions, including Louisiana, where it is held that
a proper denial of genuineness is in itself sufficient to force the
introduction of evidence by the plaintiff.0 This change seems
proper. Forged or unauthorized signatures are infrequent and
it seems just that the defendant, who usually will have evidence
on this issue more readily available, should be called upon to
put in some proof to support his allegation. Mere denial alone
should not be sufficient.
Section 59 of the NIL states that upon proof of a "defect
in title" the burden shifts to the plaintiff to establish himself
as a holder in due course if he is to overcome the defense thus
raised by the defendant.61 Since Section 55 in defining "defect
of title" does not include want or failure of consideration,6 2
the majority of courts hold that proof of either of these defenses
does not cause the burden to shift.63 Subsection (3) of Section
3-307 of the Code will change this prevailing rule. It is made
clear that proof of want or failure of consideration by the maker
will put the plaintiff to proof of his due course position. 4 Of
59. NIL § 59; LA. R.S. 7:59 (1950): "Every holder is deemed prima facie
to be a holder in due course; but when it is shown that the title of any
person who has negotiated the instrument was defective, the burden is on
the holder to prove that he or some person under whom he claims acquired
the title as holder in due course. But the last mentioned rule does not apply
in favor of a party who became bound on the instrument prior to the acqui-
sition of such defective title."
60. Maddox v. Robbert, 165 La. 694, 115 So. 905 (1928); Labbe v. Brous-
sard, 171 So. 203 (La. App. 1936); Fadaol v. Rideau, 128 So. 193 (La. App.
1930); BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES § 129 (1943).
61. See note 59 supra.
62. NIL § 55; LA. R.S. 7:55 (1950): "The title of a person who negotiates
an instrument is defective within the meaning of this Chapter when he
obtained the instrument, or any signature thereto, by fraud, duress, or force
and fear, or other unlawful means, or for illegal consideration, or when he
negotiates it in breach of faith, or under such circumstances as amount to
a fraud."
63. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 432 et seq. (1943).
64. UCC § 3-307(3), quoted note 58 supra. UCC § 3-306 provides in part:
"Unless he has the rights of holder in due course any person takes the
instrument subject to
"(c) the defenses of want or failure of consideration, non-performance
of any condition precedent, non-delivery, or delivery for a special
purpose."
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course, the plaintiff need not do so if he believes that the de-
fendant's evidence is too weak to convince the trier of fact and
prefers to submit the case without attempting to establish him-
self as a holder in due course. Louisiana is in accord with the
rule of the Code.65 This is the sounder view, since there can be
no logical reason for holding that the burden shifts upon proof
of certain kinds of personal defenses while refusing to follow
the rule in regard to want or failure of consideration which are
also personal defenses.
Two other questions not specifically dealt with by the NIL
are expressly covered by Subsection (3). Under the language
"burden to prove" of NIL Section 5906 there is a conflict as to
whether the plaintiff's burden of proving himself a holder in
due course, when that question is put at issue, is one of per-
suasion or of merely introducing evidence.6 7 The phrase "bur-
den of establishing" used in Subsection (3) is defined as burden
of persuasion;68 thus the majority rule on this question was
adopted. Louisiana is in accord.69 Britton supports this position
on the grounds that a bona fide purchaser will almost certainly
convince the jury that he is such while a purchaser of paper
obtained in a questionable manner will find it difficult to do
so. Because the full burden of persuasion is on one seeking
the due course position the latter type of holder will often fail
in his efforts to recover against a maker who has been deceived
by the payee.70
Although the NIL does not state that one seeking to estab-
lish himself as a holder in due course must discharge his burden
in respect to each requisite of the due course status, namely,
that he acquired in good faith, for value, and before maturity,
the cases decided under the act, including those in Louisiana,
are practically unanimous in holding that he must.71 At com-
mon law there was a dissent from this position, some of the
65. Credit Industrial Co. v. Jewell, 58 So.2d 239 (La. App. 1952); Com-
mercial Credit Corp. v. Setliff, 44 So.2d 167 (La. App. 1950); Toms v. Nugent,
12 So.2d 713 (La. App. 1943); Tolmas v. Norwood, 132 So. 148 (La. App. 1931),
5 TULANE L. REV. 653 (1930).
66. See note 59 supra.
67. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 432 et seq. (1943).
68. UCC § 1-201(8): "'Burden of establishing' a fact means the burden
of persuading the triers of fact that the existence of the fact is more prob-
able than its non-existence."
69. Commercial Credit Corp. v. Setliff, 44 So.2d 167 '(La. App. 1950);
Toms v. Nugent, 12 So.2d 713 (La. App. 1943).
70. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 437 et seq. (1943):
71. Id. at 438 et seq.; Commercial Credit Corp. v. Setliff, 44 So.2d 167
(La. App. 1950).
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cases holding that a presumption of good faith was raised by
proof that value was given.7 2 The Code provides that the plain-
tiff must establish that he is "in all respects a holder in due
course," thus resolving any doubt on this question.78
Conclusion
The difficulties inherent in any attempt to formulate defi-
nite conclusions as to the changes which will be effected in the
present law of negotiable instruments by a comprehensive revi-
sion such as the Commercial Code are readily apparent. The
draftsmen have not only rearranged the subject matter of the
NIL but also have made substantial changes in language; thus
the problem of differentiating substantive change from mere
re-wording is very real. The scope of this comment has been
restricted to a consideration of what appear to be some of the
more important changes and modifications. For the most part,
because of the detailed nature of the subject matter treated,
the conclusions drawn with respect to the particular provisions
discussed must stand alone. Generally, a brief survey of these
conclusions reveals that the draftsmen have done a commendable
job in eliminating confusion and conflict presently existing.
Thus the addition of an objective element in the test of good
faith for the due course position, the inclusion of a specific pro-
vision allowing a payee to become a holder in due course and
the elimination of non-delivery of an incomplete instrument as
a real defense should be recognized as distinct improvements
in the law. Also, the Code provisions dealing with fraud as a
real defense, the claims of third parties to an instrument and
burden of proof provide workable rules which should reach the
proper results. However, any undertaking of the magnitude
of the Commercial Code is likely to contain elements subject
to valid criticism. Of the particular provisions considered herein
this observation would seem to be true of the sections setting
forth the notice and value requisites of the holder in due course
status. As previously pointed out, it is believed that the rule
that a promise to pay is value should be substituted for the
present Code provision to the contrary. Insofar as notice to
the purchaser is concerned, although sound results may be
reached in particular instances by application of the Code pro-
visions, it would seem that the approach of the NIL in specify-
72. BRITTON, BILLS AND NOTES 438 (1943).
73. UCC § 3-307(3), quoted note 58 supra.
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ing general rather than particular rules has much to be said in
its favor. As no two cases present the same factual situation
the end results of efforts to resolve conflicts by providing
numerous solutions may be confusion rather than clarification.
At the very least it seems fair to conclude that some changes in
language should be made if the Code is to be adopted.
Neilson Jacobs
Private Nuisance in Louisiana Law
When one person's use of land interferes with another's use
and enjoyment of a neighboring tract, courts seek the solution
to the resulting controversy in that part of the law of torts called
"nuisance" and characterize defendant's conduct as the mainte-
nance of a nuisance if plaintiff is entitled to relief. A nuisance
and a trespass are similar in that both interfere with the inter-
ests of an occupant of land. They differ, however, in that a
trespass is usually a physical invasion of land complete in one
instance, while a nuisance is ordinarily a continuing activity on
a neighboring tract of land which produces such interferences
as noise, smoke, or odors. The technique of resolving nuisance
controversies differs greatly from that found in other areas of
tort law. In the latter, the process of weighing the various inter-
ests involved in a given controversy has been transformed into
the application of a body of relatively rigid rules, like those
concerning intent, privilege, or negligence. In the field of nui-
sance, however, the factors considered appear on the surface and
the courts weigh those factors against each other openly. For
this reason, one finds no framework of fixed rules to refer to as
the law of nuisance. One can only indicate the recurring factors
considered by the courts in nuisance cases and suggest their
relative weights in the balancing process which is the essence
of deciding such cases.
The Magnitude of the Interference
One's right to the use and enjoyment of his land is of course
limited by the rights of others to use and enjoy their own. On
the basis of this broad generalization, courts refuse to consider
an activity a nuisance unless the interference it creates is sub-
stantial in nature. To be deemed a nuisance, the defendant's
conduct must be such as would interfere with an average man's
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